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Abstract. Atomic swaps enable the transfer of value between the cryp-
tocurrencies of various blockchains without the need to trust an interme-
diary. In this paper, we propose the concept of atomic loans, which utilize
atomic swap technology to allow market participants to create overcol-
lateralized debt instruments in a trustless and disintermediated manner.
The primary use cases for atomic loans include enabling fiat/stablecoin
access for cryptocurrency holders to participate within legacy systems, as
well as enabling leverage for margin trading. We also introduce a bidding
process for liquidating collateral in the case of default which provides the
ability for a more fair distribution of collateral.
1 Disintermediated Debt Instruments
The ability to transfer value securely between the participants of a blockchain
network [1] is dependent upon the cryptographic proofs and consensus protocols
that are used to secure the network [2]. Yet in the absence of robust blockchain
interoperability solutions in this multi-ledger world, blockchains operate in silos
with users frequently depending on centralized off-chain solutions to facilitate
the exchange of value across blockchains [3].
For the purpose of lending, many centralized solutions [4] have come to
fruition to allow for the creation of cryptocurrency-backed loans, allowing users
to deposit a cryptocurrency into a centralized escrow, in exchange for a fiat
loan. These lending services are centralized entities with their own self-interests,
and thus have the ability to seize or steal funds. In addition, there is no way
to keep these entities accountable [5], and due to the probabilistic finality of
cryptocurrencies, there is no way to recover these funds [6].
There exists alternative solutions that enable more decentralized cryptocurrency-
backed loans. However, these decentralized services are still intermediated, ei-
ther by smart contract owners or governance systems built into the protocol [7].
Evidently, there is a lack of solutions that enable cryptocurrency-backed loans
without delegation of trust to an intermediary.
Additionally, very few of these solutions enable loans to occur across borders
and jurisdictions at the protocol level, creating silos of liquidity only accessible by
a fraction of the potential users that would benefit from this type of debt instru-
ment. This is a major threat to open, neutral, borderless, censorship-resistant
networks. In this paper we introduce how atomic swaps [8] can be extended
for the creation of the cross-chain debt contracts, which we have named atomic
loans.
2 Setup
Throughout the paper we define the two primary parties as Alice (Party A/Debtor/
Borrower) and Bob (Party B/Creditor/Lender), in addition to Charlie (Party
C/Bidder), an optional third party in the case of default. For the purposes of
discovery and matching, we assume that Alice and Bob have some type of com-
munication with each other before entering into a agreement.
In this paper, we review how atomic swaps work, then show how atomic loans
can be created as an extension of this underlying technology. We show various
features, such as early cancellation and liquidation of collateral in the event of
a default. Finally, we discuss some limitations of trustless atomic loans.
3 Atomic Swap
Suppose Alice wishes to exchange ACoin for Bobs BCoin. If Alice were to simply
send a transaction with ACoin to Bob, Bob could decide to not reciprocate and
keep both Alice’s ACoin and his own BCoin. These methods require one party
to delegate trust to the other in order to exchange value. To facilitate trustless
exchange, Alice locks her ACoin’s into a Hashed Time Lock Contract [9] (HTLC).
In layman’s terms, a HTLC enables a user to lock funds and have another party
redeem them using a secret. If they do not redeem the funds within the lock time,
the original party can refund the amount. In this case, Alice locks her ACoin
funds for lock time T with Secret A. Subsequently, Bob locks his BCoin funds
into a HTLC for lock time T/2. Alice can then redeem Bobs BCoins in time T/2.
When she does so, she reveals Secret A, enabling Bob to redeem ACoins funds
with adequate time T . If Alice chooses not to redeem and allows the contact to
expire, then Bob can refund his BCoins after time T/2, and Alice can refund her
ACoins after time T . This process is known as an atomic swap [8].
4 Atomic Loan
Notice how the process of presenting secrets in atomic swaps enables for the
parties to exchange values at specific times without the need to act honestly. This
framework allows us to extend the concept of atomic swaps to enable debt and
repayment between parties at different intervals in a loan process, by strategically
revealing secrets to represent various actions in the loan process.
4.1 Secrets
Both parties generate two secrets before engaging in an atomic loan. We will
call this Secret A1, A2 for Alice, and Secret B1, B2 for Bob. Additionally, in the
case of a default, Charlie also generates a secret. We will call this Secret C.
By having Bob reveal B1 to signify acceptance of locked collateral and Alice
reveal A1 in the process of accepting the loan principal, the contract can deter-
mine when a participant should or should not be able to redeem funds from the
contracts with the use of a HTLC using Secret A1 or B1.
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For example, to determine whether Bob is able to seize a predetermined
percentage of the collateral (i.e. Seizable Collateral as per section 4.3) put forth
by Alice in the case of a default, we can use the following process. If Alice has
revealed A1 in the process of accepting the loan principal, and no other actions
have occurred in the loan process, then we can assume that Alice has defaulted
on the loan, and Bob has the right to claim the Seizable Collateral.
Additionally, Secrets A2 and B2 can be used to represent the repayment of
the loan and refunding of collateral, or for the agreement of parties to liquidate
the collateral in the case of default.
Secret C is also used in the case of default. During the default period, the
collateral acts as a multisignature wallet [10] enabling Alice and Bob to both
sign off on who the funds should be sent to. They both generate signatures for
this, and once Charlie is satisfied that the signatures from Alice and Bob are
valid for a multisignature transaction sending the funds to him, he reveals Secret
C.
Secret Revealed Used
A1
when Alice accepts and withdraws
loan
by Bob to seize the collateral in the
case that Alice defaults on the loan
repayment
A2
in bidding period if Alice has
already signed multisignature
transaction to accept
Charlies bid
by Charlie, along with Secret B2, Alice
signature for multisignature transaction
and Bob signature for multisignature
transaction to redeem Alices collateral
in the bidding period
B1 when Bob accepts Alices locked collateral
by Alice to withdraw the loan
principal after Bob has accepted her
locked collateral
B2
if Bob allows HTLC containing
loan principal to expire and refunds principal
OR if Bob redeems loan repayment
HTLC containing principal plus interest
OR in bidding period, if Bob has already
signed the multisignature transaction
for Alice’s collateral and accepts bid of Charlie
by Charlie along with Secret A2,
Alice signature for multisignature
transaction, and Bob signature for
multisignature transaction to redeem
Alices collateral in the bidding period
C
when Charlie has verified that both
signatures provided by Alice and
Bob in the bidding period are valid
by Alice or Bob to allow them to
redeem the bid locked by Charlie
4.2 Loan Process
For ease of reading, we have broken the various parts of the atomic loan process
into four periods, loan, bidding, seizure, and refund periods. These serve to
enable easier understanding of the loan process and split up the outcomes that
could arise from an atomic loan.
3
4.2.1 Loan Period The loan period is designated to handle the loan with-
drawal and repayment process. If the repayment is successful, the other periods
are not necessary. Alice first requests a loan, and sends the loan information to
Bob. Bob then locks the loan amount into a HTLC. Once Alice is satisfied that
the principal of the loan has been locked, she will lock their collateral into a
HTLC. Once Bob is satisfied that the collateral has been locked, he releases the
funds to Alice. Alice then takes the funds for the duration of the loan period,
and then pays back the principal plus interest at the end of the loan period.
Once Bob is satisfied that the loan has been repaid, he reclaims the principal
plus interest and enables Alice to refund her collateral.
4.2.2 Bidding Period In the case that Alice does not repay the loan, or
Bob suspects that the loan collateral has gone below the agreed upon minimum
collateralization ratio, Alice and Bob have the option to enter into a ‘Bidding
Period’ which liquidates the collateral, and repays Bob for the principal, interest
plus a liquidation fee.
4.2.3 Seizure Period If Alice or Bob decide not to opt into liquidation of
the collateral, then Bob will have the option to claim the Seizable Collateral.
This is defined before the loan begins. This, of course, opens Bob up to market
fluctuation.
4.2.4 Refund Period If Bob stops responding during the previous periods
after Alice has locked their collateral, then Alice can still recover their collateral
during this period as a last resort.
4.3 Collateral Locking
When Alice and Bob agree to the terms of the loan, they also agree to the
percentage of collateral that Bob will be entitled to in the event that Alice or Bob
decide not to opt into liquidation of the collateral in the Bidding Period. Since
inputs and outputs cannot be predetermined in a typical UTXO [11] scheme, we
lock these two values separately into distinct P2SH contracts, into the Seizable
Collateral, that Bob has the ability to seize in the Seizure Period, and Refundable
Collateral, that Alice has the ability to refund in the Seizure Period. Both the
Seizable and Refundable can be claimed by Charlie following the conclusion of
the Bidding Period (see section 5.5).
5 Protocol Specification
5.1 Becoming a Lender
In order for Bob to become a Lender in an atomic loan, he must first generate
two secrets B1, B2, and then lock the principal of the loan into a HTLC.
5.2 Becoming a Borrower
Alice can become a Borrower in an atomic loan by ensuring they have the neces-
sary collateral in ACoin to cover a loan in BCoin with a collateral-to-debt ratio
that both parties have agreed upon. This can be based on protocols with similar
collateral-to-debt ratio requirements [12] such as a 150% collateral-to-debt ratio.
In addition, the reputation of an individual based on their performance within
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past atomic loans can help determine this ratio. This reputation can be based
on the address alone, which retains the pseudo-anonymous nature of the loan.
Alice then generates two secrets, Secret A1 and Secret A2. Alice then locks their
collateral into two HTLC’s.
5.3 Initiating Loan
Once Bob is satisfied that Alice has locked her collateral into an HTLC, Bob
can provide the Secret B1 to Alice. Alice can then use Secret B1 to redeem the
principal of the loan from the atomic loan contract, in the process revealing
Secret A1, which acts as proof that she withdrew the loan principal.
5.4 Repaying Loan
5.4.1 Successful Repayment Once Alices loan term has finished, Alice re-
pays the principal plus interest agreed upon and locks it into the loan contract.
In order for Bob to redeem, he must reveal Secret B2. At this point, Alice has
both Secret B1 and Secret B2. Alice now has all the elements required to refund
her initial collateral.
5.4.2 Unsuccessful repayment If Alice does not repay back the loan at the
end of the loan period, either Alice or Bob can initiate the bidding process.
5.4.3 Successful Repayment Without Reciprocation In the case that
Alice’s loan term finishes and she repays the loan, and Bob decides not to accept
the loan and release Secret B2, there is no way for Alice to refund her collateral.
To ensure that Bob does not simply start the bidding process and profit from
the additional liquidation fees accrued, the contract can detect if Alice has paid
back the loan to stop the bidding process from occurring. The longer Bob waits
to reciprocate, the less interest he gets from the loan. At a certain point, the lock
time will run out on the contract, and Bob must resort to redeeming the Seizable
Collateral in the Seizure Period to compensate himself for the loan capital he
provided. The timeout period until Bob can collect the Seizable Collateral should
be sufficiently long to ensure that present value of money is a deterrent from
choosing this last resort route.
5.5 Bidding Process in the Case of Default
In the event that Alice does not pay back the loan, the bidding process serves
as a fair way to liquidate the collateral in order to ensure that Bob gets his fair
share of the collateral, and that Alice gets access to the correct valuation of the
remaining collateral.
This process only occurs in the case that Alice does not pay back the loan.
Either Alice or Bob can initiate the bidding process. This is done by calling a
function in the contract, changing the state of the contract to bidding, which
will allow any third party, in addition to Alice or Bob, to partake in the bidding
process (since even if Alice or Bob aren’t allowed in the bidding process, they
could just use another address anyway).
In this process, participants will stake a BCoin amount higher than the pre-
vious bidder, which then triggers a refund of the BCoin amount staked as part
of the previous highest bid to its respective bidder. When bidding is closed, the
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highest bidders (Charlie’s) funds will be locked into an HTLC to give adequate
time for Alice and Bob to sign a multisignature transaction to allow for Charlie
to redeem both the Refundable and Seizable Collateral.
5.6 Charlie’s Acquisition of Alice’s Collateral
For the purposes of allowing Charlie to obtain the ACoin collateral through a
swap with his staked BCoin, Alice and Bob must both sign the multisignature
transaction to send funds to Charlie’s ACoin blockchain address. This is for the
purpose of preventing front-running. Once Charlie is satisfied that the multisig-
nature transaction signatures are valid, he can reveal a Secret C. After this,
Alice and Bob must also reveal Secret A2 and B2.
Alternatively, for a higher cost, the contract itself on the BCoin blockchain
could verify the signatures, rather than requiring Secret C, provided that the
original ACoin transaction was represented in some manner in the BCoin blockchain.
However, doing signature validation of a multisignature from another blockchain
would be quite costly, and would only be worthwhile for large transactions (pro-
vided there was a way to do it that did not exceed any transaction cost re-
straints).
Once the contract verifies that Secret A2 and B2 have been revealed, the
funds that were staked by Charlie will be redeemable for Alice and Bob, with
Bob receiving principal, interest and an additional fee, and Alice receiving the
remainder. Charlie will be able to use the multisignature transaction signatures
as well as Secret A2 and B2 to redeem the Refundable and Seizable Collateral.
5.6.1 Collateral Acquisition where Alice or Bob is Charlie We describe
the scenario where either Alice or Bob is Charlie in this swap. After both Alice
and Bob sign the multisignature transaction to send funds to Charlie, the double-
agent party might decide not to reveal their secret (A2 or B2). In this case, they
will end up revealing the secret anyway on the ACoin blockchain if they decide
to try and redeem the collateral (both Refundable and Seizable) as Charlie. The
other party who did reveal their secret can then call a function on the BCoin
blockchain revealing the unrevealed secret in the contract so that the double-
agent (non-secret revealer) does not refund the bid.
For the purpose of this example, lets assume Alice is secretly Charlie. In the
case that both parties provide a valid signature for the multisignature transaction
with the output being Charlie’s ACoin address, and Bob reveals Secret B2. Alice
can redeem the collateral as Charlie, by using the signature of herself and Bob,
as well as Secret B2 that was revealed by Bob, and Secret A2 which only she
has access to. However, once the collateral is redeemed, Bob can scan the ACoin
chain and see that Secret A2 has been revealed, and subsequently reveal it on
the BCoin chain by calling a specific function dedicated to this scenario, in order
for him to be able to redeem Charlie’s bid.
5.7 Collateral Seizure in the Case of Default and Failed Bidding
In the case where Alice or Bob decide not to sign or reveal either of their secrets
at the conclusion of bidding, Bob will have the opportunity to redeem the Seiz-
able Collateral in the Seizure Period. This is possible after a set amount of time
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allocated to the Bidding Period (preferably longer, to give incentive for both par-
ties to opt for bidding process). The amount of funds allocated to Refundable
versus Seizable Collateral is decided before entering the loan contract. There is
a lot of consideration around what percentage of the total collateral should be
allocated to Seizable Collateral and be redeemable by Bob since market fluctu-
ation could give incentive for either party to opt for Collateral Seizure over the
bidding process (see diagram below). There is also the current market to take
into account (i.e. bull market vs bear market). This will need to be decided by
both parties before entering the loan contract. During the Seizure Period, Bob
will be able to redeem the collateral, using Secret A1. Alice is subsequently able
to redeem the Refundable Collateral during the Seizure Period as well.
5.8 Refunding Collateral as a Last Resort
In the case that Alice locks her collateral, and is unable to take out the loan
amount because Bob never reveals any secrets (potentially because he is unhappy
with the amount of collateral Alice locked in), Alice will have the opportunity
to refund her Seizable and Refundable Collateral in the Refund Period. This is a
last resort in the case that Bob halts interaction with the blockchain altogether.
Repayment Outcome Alice
Payment of loan
principal plus interest
ACoin value increases
Time value of money
Reputation
Default on loan ACoin value decreases
Incentives for Alice to payback the loan principal plus interest
Repayment Outcome Bob
Accept payment of loan
principal plus interest
ACoin value decreases
Time value of money
Reputation
Wait for seizure period ACoin value increases
Incentives for Bob to accept the loan repayment from Alice
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Default Outcome Alice Bob
Enter bidding period
ACoin value increases
Time value of money
Reputation
ACoin value decreases
Time value of money
Reputation
Wait for seizure period ACoin value decreases ACoin value increases
Incentives for each party to choose an outcome in the case that Alice defaults
on the loan
Legend:
ACoin value increases/decreases: value changes relative to BCoin value
Time value of money: Coin is worth more in the present than in the future
Reputation: Good actions will result in favorable interest rates and counterpar-
ties in the future
6 Other Considerations
Similar to any long term contracts on the blockchain, there is always the possi-
bility that there may be a change to the underlying blockchain, such as a hard
or soft fork, in which a change occurs in the underlying hashing or signing algo-
rithm of the chains involved. There is the possibility that Alice and Bob could
cooperate in order for the loan to complete properly, but there would need to be
delegation of trust. In the case that a fork occurs affecting the hashing algorithm
on ACoin, if Alice defaults, and isn’t cooperative, she can exercise her ability
to refund the collateral amount during the refund period. However, Bob can
also harm Alice by revealing the secret for accepting repayment after a fork has
occurred, affecting her ability to refund her collateral until the refund period.
The atomic loan process is unlikely to be user friendly if dealing directly with
the blockchain since it requires an understanding of atomic swaps, hashing, and
basic knowledge of the underlying blockchain.
The bidding process requires the BCoin blockchain to have smart contract
capabilities in order to allow detection of Alice and Bob’s acceptances of Charlie’s
bid which is a prerequisite for the redemption of the liquidated funds.
There is no need for SecretB1 to be in the form of a secret and secret hash pair
for the purposes of the atomic loan. If the BCoin blockchain has smart contract
capabilities, then it is possible for this to be represented as a state update. In
order to ensure that the swaps expire in the proper time frame, timelocks must
be set in linux epoch timestamps, rather than use block height. This is because
it is difficult to predict the future blocks between chains.
There now exists various different implementations of stablecoins, or price
stable cryptocurrencies that are pegged against fiat currencies. While stablecoins
may serve to greatly reduce the volatility of the asset upon which the loan
principal is denominated in, not all stablecoins are created equal and can take
vastly different approaches in the implementation of peg. As such, participants
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who choose to participate in stablecoin-denominated loans must be willing to
trust the underlying peg of the stablecoin.
6.1 Similar projects
Similar projects for decentralized loan contracts focus primarily on ERC20 to-
kens on the Ethereum Blockchain [13]. In our approach, we outline a protocol
that can be used between different blockchains, with the requirements that one
of the blockchains be smart contract compatible, and that they both support the
creation of HTLCs with the same hash function. Additionally, the blockchains
do not need to be Turing complete like Ethereum as long as the atomic loan
does not make use of the bidding process. Others have built projects where the
entirety of the loan is intermediated by the governance mechanism. Loans on
such protocols require the delegation of trust to holders of the governance token
as well as the governance mechanism as a whole which is not controlled by the
underlying consensus mechanism of the blockchain it runs on [7].
7 Conclusion
The adoption and development of disintermediated blockchain applications is
an ongoing process. While it is still not clear what features blockchains should
support to enable the development of disintermediated applications on top of
it, what is clear is that current solutions to obtain fiat/stablecoin liquidity via
cryptocurrency loans leaves much to be desired in terms of disintermediation and
the delegation of trust. We have demonstrated how the underlying concepts and
technology of atomic swaps can be used for alternative purposes such as atomic
loans. Atomic loans provide a sound and resilient alternative for crypto holders
to leverage their holdings to enable liquidity in a disintermediated manner and
freely participate within the constraints of legacy financial systems.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Contract Diagrams
This section contains example diagrams for the contracts described in section 4.
Note that boxes correspond to transactions where the fill color indicates which
blockchain the transaction takes place on, while the border color indicates who
can publish the transaction.
Fig. 1. Basic atomic loan construction.
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Fig. 2. Bidding period.
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Fig. 3. Seizure and refund periods.
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